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THE TARIFF POLICY OF RHODESIA, 1899-1963
R. L. COLE
The purpose of this paper is to outline, in a more convenient form than 
is at present available, the development of Rhodesian tariff policy from the 
beginning of the century to the end of the Federal period. It is hoped to 
publish a paper on subsequent developments at a later date.
A detailed evaluation of the policies followed is outside the deliberately 
limited scope of this paper, but such an evaluation would be of great value 
if and when the necessary information can be obtained.
Pre-War Developments
The early development of the Southern Rhodesia customs tariff was 
greatly influenced by the connection with South Africa. Customs duties were 
first imposed in 1899, by virtue of the Customs Tariff and Management 
Ordinance of that year, the rates being the same as those applicable under 
the South African tariff.
In 1903, Southern Rhodesia joined the South African Customs Union, 
when the tariff then agreed upon was subjected to special provisions admitting 
the right of Southern Rhodesia to suspend the duties on certain items and 
to grant greater preference to British goods under the clause of the Order 
in Council^in 1898, generally known as the ‘Rhodes Clause’. This Agreement 
was terminated in 1910, following the union of the four South African 
colonies and it was replaced by Customs Agreements between Southern 
Rhodesia and (a) the Union of South Africa; (b) Northern Rhodesia; and 
(c) Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland. These Agreements were further 
revised in 1914 and again in 1924. In 1930 a revised Agreement with the 
Union came into being. This reserved to the contracting parties, subject to 
certain provisions, freedom to frame their own customs tariffs. However, 
the Government of Southern Rhodesia agreed to conform, as far as possible, 
to the practice and procedure of tfie Union as regards refunds, rebates, 
removals in bond, etc. The free exchange of Rhodesian and South African 
products and manufactures was affirmed as a general principle, though duties 
were levied by Southern Rhodesia on a number of items, including beer, 
wines and spirits, cigarettes, and motor vehicles, but at rates below those 
charged for imports from the United Kingdom, the British Dominions and 
Colonies. As regards goods other than those mentioned, manufactured in 
either territory, a fiscal payment at agreed rates, was made by the exporting 
territory to the receiving territory.
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This arrangement was superseded in 1935 by a trade agreement between 
the two countries. The effects of this was to abolish the system of fiscal 
payments, imports from one territory to the other being subject to an import 
duty at agreed rates. With certain exceptions, the rates levied in Southern 
Rhodesia on goods grown, produced or manufactured in the Union were 
based upon the rates applicable to the United Kingdom and Colonies, less 
rebates as agreed upon. The general rebate was 20 per cent, but rose as high 
as 50 per cent in the case of dried and bottled fruits, blasting compounds, 
cigarettes and a few other items. Provision was made for the free exchange 
of slaughter stock and of leaf tobacco up to an agreed quantity annually.
Following the Ottawa Conference an Agreement came into effect in 
1932 under which the United Kingdom granted Rhodesian tobacco a pre­
ference of 2s. 0]d. per lb. over foreign tobacco and invited the Governments 
of the non-self-governing colonies and protectorates to grant Rhodesia any 
preference which was accorded to any other part of the Empire. Among a 
number of other minor concessions, the United Kingdom undertook not to 
reduce the 10 per cent duty, imposed on asbestos of foreign origin without 
the consent of Southern Rhodesia. In return, Southern Rhodesia granted 
specific preferences to the United Kingdom on a few items including cotton 
piece-goods and electrical equipment, and agreed to consider the further 
extension of preferences already accorded to United Kingdom goods when 
economic and budgetary conditions permitted. Southern Rhodesia also 
accorded the non-self-governing colonies, protectorates and British mandated 
territories preferences on a small number of commodities and further accorded 
to these countries any preferences accorded to the United Kingdom, if the 
United Kingdom so requested.
A further relevant agreement was that concluded by the governments 
of Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia which came into effect in 1933. 
The Agreement provided for a uniform tariff which should not be altered 
without consultation between the governments. The Agreement also provided 
for a free exchange of domestic produce with the exception of beer, wines 
and spirits, and for the payment of excise and customs duty on re-exports 
by the Government of Jjie exporting country to the importing country, at 
the rates applicable in the importing country. In the case of goods manu­
factured in one country, and exported to the other, the exporting country 
was required to make a fiscal payment to the importing country based on 
the varying percentages of the free-on-rail value of different classes of goods. 
This Agreement did not apply to the north-eastern portion of Northern 
Rhodesia which fell within the conventional boundaries of the Congo basin 
and was subject to the Congo Basin Treaties of 1888 which forbade the 
granting of preferential customs tariff rates.
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The pre-war tariff was designed for revenue purposes. The interests of 
primary industry were acknowledged in the liberal treatment accorded to 
plant, machinery, tools and construction goods, and those of manufacturing 
industry in the system of rebates of duty on raw materials and capital goods 
for use in manufacturing in Rhodesia which was first introduced in 1925. 
These concessions were, however, the limit of official assistance to industry 
and, despite some complaints from such manufacturing interests as there 
were, the Colony adhered to this policy throughout the depressed years of the 
‘thirties’.1
The Margolis Report
The growth of manufacturing industry during World War II (the value 
of gross manufacturing output increased from £8.2 million in 1938 to £15.1 
million in 1944) led to the appointment of an official Committee of Enquiry 
into the Protection of Secondary Industry which reported in December, 1946. 
The Report of this Committee*  appears to have had an important influence 
on Southern Rhodesia’s tariff policy until the formation of the Federation 
and it is, therefore, a crucial document in terms of the Colony’s post-war 
economic development.
The Report marks a distinct step in the direction of the protection of 
secondary industry, yet there can be little doubt that it was a reluctant step. 
The Report quoted the Commission of Enquiry into the Mining Industry in 
Southern Rhodesia which had published its report in 1945:
‘In the opinion of your Commissioners the great importance of exports 
in relationship to the Rhodesian National Income and to the full employ- 
* ment of its people cannot be over-emphasised . . . Only through exports 
which could be economically produced with the unskilled labour resources 
of Africans under European supervision is it possible to pay for the 
great range of imported commodities, both capital and consumers’ goods, 
necessary to promote modern economic production and transport in the 
territory and to ensure the European population a standard of living 
sufficiently high to attract them to the territory.
Fundamentally the Rhodesian economy, excepting the primitive sector 
of purely subsistence production in the Native Reserves, is an economy 
dependent on specialised economic relations with the world economy, 
and is unable to maintain its existing income standards in isolation 
from it.
1 This sum m ary o f developments before W orld W ar I I  is derived from  the Official 
Y ear Book o f Southern Rhodesia (No. 4, 1952) and the R eport o f the Com m ittee o f Inquiry into the Protection o f the Secondary Industries in Southern Rhodesia, 1946 
(the M argolis Report).
* H ereafter referred to as the M argolis R eport. T he Chairm an was M r. W. Margolis. 
A nother m em ber was M r. R. Rushm ere, a t  present Deputy Secretary to  the M inistry o f Commerce and Industry.
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The National Income of the Rhodesian people is dependent on the 
successful exploitation of the comparative advantage which they obtain 
by concentrating their productive efforts, directly and indirectly on 
producing exports. In return for these they are able to import goods 
and services which can either not be produced in Rhodesia at all or whose 
production would be so expensive as to yield a very much lesser quantity 
of such goods for the same effort as is now devoted to the production 
of the exports with which to pay for the imported goods, with a con­
sequent lowering in the standard of living of the Rhodesian people.’2
The Margolis Committee specifically endorsed this expression of the 
classical theory of comparative advantage and went on to warn that:
‘If the people of Southern Rhodesia are to maintain or raise their 
standard of living, then we must guard against so called “remedies” 
applied internally which might hamper the necessary stimulus of income 
which arises from our export trade.’3
Between 1924 and 1943 the ratio of exports to National Income had 
never been less than 43 per cent and, in 1934, had been as high as 56 per 
cent.4 The Report acknowledged that the contribution of secondary industry 
to exports had increased during the war years from 8.9 per cent in 1938 to 
14.9 per cent in 19445 but argued that
‘the figures in respect of the later war years, though an excellent indi­
cation of the technical ability of Southern Rhodesia in the manufacturing 
sphere, must be regarded as largely anomalous and cannot be regarded 
as permanent. The products of the secondary industries of Southern 
Rhodesia cannot yet be regarded as falling within that category of 
commodities in which the territory specialises from the point of view 
of world economy.’6
In their evidence to the Committee the representatives of the mining 
and agricultural sectors had been opposed to ‘artifical assistance’ being given 
to the secondary industries:
‘Whilst these primary industries were prepared to agree that the judicious 
development of secondary industries in Southern Rhodesia was impor­
tant to the futur^ welfare of Rhodesia; whilst they were prepared to 
admit that it might be advisable to protect certain infant industries for 
a limited period; whilst they agreed that protection against such practices 
as dumping was necessary, they were yet firm and unanimous in their
2 M argolis, para. 23.
3 Ibid., para. 24.
4  Ibid., para. 23.
5 Ibid., T able HI.
6 Ibid., para. 32.
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opposition to any policy which would have the effect of permanently 
curtailing the economic development and expansion of the primary 
industries. In certain instances they went so far as to oppose any assistance 
being granted to secondary industries even if the effect upon the primary 
industries was of a guaranteed temporary nature. The representatives 
of the basic industries of Southern Rhodesia were fully alive to the 
significance of the costs of production as a limiting factor towards the 
expansion of export trade and they rightly emphasised not only the 
importance of export trade to the economy of this territory but also 
the fact that their industries were the mainstay of this export trade.’7
The arguments of agriculture and mining were accepted:
‘The Committee accordingly recommends that, in considering forms of 
assistance to be applied to any particular branch of industry, account 
must be taken of the effect of such action upon the costs of production 
of the remaining branches of industry and that for economic reasons no 
such action should be taken if the effects upon these costs of production 
is likely to be of a permanent nature. The Committee stresses in particu­
lar the serious effect upon the standard of living of both the European 
and native populations, as well as the capacity of Southern Rhodesia 
to absorb further immigration, if the branches of industry adversely 
affected are those producing for export without artificial assistance from 
the Government.’8
The operative clause in the above recommendation was, of course, ‘if the 
effects of these costs of production is likely to be of a permanent nature’. 
In making this qualification the Committee was accepting the ‘infant industry’ 
argument and it went on to argue the case for what it called ‘controlled 
assistance’ which was differentiated from ‘protection’. The obstacle con­
fronting the Rhodesian industrialists were stressed with the main emphasis 
on ‘dumping’, but other difficulties were cited:
‘The risk which the manufacturer takes is obviously rendered the greater 
by virtue of the exploratory nature of his undertaking and such risks 
must be paid for or the venture will not take place. It is moreover more 
difficult to attract the necessary capital. The technical skill required is 
often not available and, in order to attract it, higher wages and salaries 
have to be offered. In Southern Rhodesia a very marked bias exists 
against locally manufactured commodities . . . The industrialists in 
Southern Rhodesia often bases his venture on the belief that the market 
available to him will expand with the development of the native. This 
involves, in practice, a testing of the natives’ future tastes. The Rhodesian 
market is often supplied by those producing concerns which we desire
7 Ibid., para. 25.
8 Ibid., para. 37.
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to attract to Southern Rhodesia: the result is a reluctance to take active 
steps to open branches in Southern Rhodesia because the market is 
already held by those concerns.’9
The Committee held that these obstacles and the prospects of future 
industrial activity justified ‘controlled assistance’:
‘the Committee is of (the) opinion that assistance over a limited period, 
with sufficient safeguards to the consumer, may in many cases prove a 
wise investment for the people of Southern Rhodesia as a whole. Such 
an investment will undoubtedly over a limited period of years, show 
a loss in the shape of an annual expenditure on locally manufactured 
goods in excess of the expenditure that would take place on similar 
imported articles. However . . .  an initial loss of this nature may rightly 
be regarded as a capital investment which, in the not far distant future, 
will render returns to the people of the country sufficient to warrant the 
investment. This is not protection in the sense that the consumer in 
Southern Rhodesia will at all times be compelled to pay more for an 
article because it is manufactured in Southern Rhodesia. It is rather a 
method of ensuring that the consumers will ultimately receive locally 
manufactured articles at prices cheaper than would have to be paid for 
similar imported articles.’10
To safeguard the consumer the Committee recommended that certain 
conditions should be fulfilled before assistance was given to manufacturers. 
These included:
(a) that it should be visualized that market conditions would ultimately 
permit the manufacture of the commodity concerned without the benefit 
of tariff assistance;
(b) that the marketing of the commodity produced as a result of the 
assistance granted should be carried out under conditions of competition 
and that in order to ensure these competitive conditions, assistance should 
not be granted unless the market was thought to justify at least two 
competing firms, or if only one such firm was warranted, then that con­
cern must agree to a scrutiny of its accounts.
(c) that in order fo keep down the cost structure of productive activity, 
assistance should be confined as far as possible to end or consumer 
products.11
The Committee further recommended that in administering the new 
policy the Minister responsible should have the services of a Tariff Advisory
9 Ibid., para. 19S.
10 Ibid., para. 197.
11 Ibid., para. 200.
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Committee the membership of which should include three members of the 
Industrial Development Commission, one of whom should be Chairman, 
and representatives of the Chambers of Commerce and Industry. Thus, from 
the beginning, it was those who were concerned to promote industrial develop­
ment who were closest to the ear of the Minister. The nearest thing to 
consumer representation was the spokesman from the Chamber of Commerce. 
Clearly the preponderance of industrial interests was not without significance 
for policy making.
Interim Customs Union With South Africa
The return of peacetime conditions with the consequent greater avail­
ability of imported goods did nothing to reduce the dissatisfaction of Rho­
desian manufacturers. The Central African market was small and the 1935 
trade agreement with the Union was proving a severe handicap. The Margolis 
Report had served to create a climate of opinion favourable to a greater 
degree of protection. Moreover, international opinion had come to regard 
preferential arrangements such as those existing between Rhodesia and South 
Africa with some hostility. On the other hand the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade gave some encouragement to the formation of customs 
unions and suggestions were made for re-establishing the customs union 
between the two countries. Negotiations were begun in 1947, an interim 
customs union was agreed in November, 1948, and this came into force in 
April, 1949.12 The Agreement was to continue in force for five years and 
thereafter for further periods of five years, subject to six months’ notice of 
intention to terminate it.
Although the Agreement provided only for an interim arrangement it 
was clearly stated in the preamble that the ultimate objective was the 
‘removal of all customs and other trade barriers between the two countries’ 
and ‘to re-establish a full and complete Customs Union’. The Union under­
took to co-operate in a policy of fostering expansion in Southern Rhodesia 
and the governments agreed to consult with a view to aligning their tariffs 
within a reasonable period, subject to the understanding that neither party 
was under any obligation to modify its existing preferential margins. The 
extension of the Agreement of neighbouring territories was also envisaged.
The main provisions of the Agreement were as follows:
(1) Except for wines and spirits, cigarettes, vegetable oils, manufactured 
tobacco and unmanufactured tobacco in excess of a minimum quota, 
the products of Southern Rhodesia were to enjoy duty-free entry into 
the Union Of South Africa.
12 F o r a  fuller discussion o f this Agreem ent see T. H. Kelly, ‘The Transition to  Customs U nion in Southern A frica’, South African Journal of Economics, Volum e 22, No. 3, 1954.
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(2) Exports of Rhodesian slaughter beef and cattle to South Africa were 
freed from quantitive restriction for a period of five years, though the 
flow of these products was to be regulated by the Livestock and Meat 
Industries Control Board of the Union in consultation with the Cold 
Storage Commission of Southern Rhodesia.
(3) The list of agricultural products subject to permit before importation 
into either territory was slightly extended.
(4) During the transitional period before the establishment of a full customs 
union Southern Rhodesia was to have the right to levy import duties on 
a specified list of South African products. These included revenue duties 
on wines, spirits and motor vehicles and protective duties on about 
seventy items. The purpose of the latter was clearly to give protection 
to Rhodesia’s ‘infant’ secondary industries against competition from the 
established industries of the Union. However, the rates of duty were low 
—below those which applied to imports from the United Kingdom
(5) A Customs Union Council was established to report on the working of 
the Agreement, to investigate any representations made by either govern­
ment and generally to make recommendations on matters relating to the 
Agreement.
As signatories to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, both 
South Africa and Rhodesia were obliged to satisfy the other contracting 
parties that the Interim Customs Union Agreement was not designed simply 
to perpetuate preferential arrangements between them. Accordingly, the 
Agreement was submitted for approval to the Conference of Contracting 
Parties at Annecy in 1949. The Agreement was approved but the signatories 
were required:
(i) to submit to the Contracting Parties annually the report of the Customs 
Union Council;
(ii) to report by not later than mid-1952 to the Contracting Parties on the 
progress achieved in eliminating the remaining trade barriers between 
the two countries and towards the application of a common tariff and 
regulations on imports from other Contracting Parties;
(iii) to submit to the Contracting Parties, by not later than mid-1954 a plan 
and schedule for the completion of the customs union; and
(iv) to complete the re-establishment of the customs union as early as 
possible and not later than 1st April, 1959.
Thus, it was anticipated that full customs union would be achieved 
within ten years of the coming into operation of the interim arrangement.
The Interim Agreement was followed by a rapid expansion of trade 
between the two countries. The Union’s exports of domestic produce to 
Southern Rhodesia increased from approximately £10.5 million in 1948 to
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£23.5 million in 1953. Exports of Southern Rhodesian domestic products to 
the Union increased even more rapidly, from £1.2 million in 1948 to nearly 
£7 million in 1953.
It would be an error to attribute the increases in the value of trade 
solely to the removal of trade barriers as a result of the Agreement. Allowance 
must be made for price changes and the higher level of economic activity 
which prevailed in both countries. The total foreign trade of both countries 
expanded considerably in these years, but it is significant that the Union’s 
exports of domestic produce to Southern Rhodesia did not increase in the 
same ratio as its total merchandise exports (i.e. excluding gold), whereas 
the proportionate increase in the exports of Southern Rhodesia to the Union 
was very much greater than the growth of total exports.
There is no doubt that in the years following the Agreement the Union 
enjoyed a larger share of Rhodesia’s foreign trade than hitherto and that 
the relative shares of the United Kingdom and the United States declined. 
However, this does not necessarily mean that the Agreement had a trade 
diversion effect for the Union’s products did not enjoy very much freer 
access than they had under the 1935 Agreement while it is probable that the 
increase of Rhodesian exports was at the expense of South African manu­
facturers rather than of other imports. South African industries which were 
particularly affected by Rhodesian competition included those sections of the 
clothing industry producing low and medium priced garments, the textile 
industry, the rubber section of the footwear industry, the toy industry and 
the fibre suit-case industry.
It was alleged by the South African manufacturers that the failure to 
align external tariffs meant that Rhodesian clothing and textile manufacturers 
were able to obtain imported raw materials on more favourable terms than 
their Union competitors. In respect of the toy industry it was argued that 
differences in import restrictions enabled Rhodesian manufacturers to import 
the latest dies and equipment thus giving them an advantage over Union 
producers. Further, Union manufacturers complained that lower wage costs 
and less stringent industrial legislation in Southern Rhodesia placed them at 
a disadvantage. It may be noted that the products just mentioned were in­
cluded in Annexur£ C of the Agreement and thus received limited protection 
against South African competition in Rhodesia while having duty-free access 
to the South African market. The complaints of the South African manu­
facturers are thus comprehensible.
Progress towards the alignment of external tariffs as provided for in 
the Agreement was slow. By 1954 agreement between the two governments 
had been reached in respect of a relatively small number of items, accounting 
for only 3.4 per cent of Southern Rhodesia’s total imports from all sources 
in 1951 and 4.5 per cent of the Union’s total imports in that year.
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The difficulties which hindered the process of alignment were of two 
main kinds: those arising from different margins of preference for United 
Kingdom goods and those caused by different policies in the two 
countries. Preferential margins were a matter of fundamental policy especially 
in Rhodesia and could only be aligned after negotiation with the United 
Kingdom. Moreover, obligations assumed under G.A.T.T. were also involved.
In retrospect it seems clear that the full Customs Union would not have 
been achieved, even if Federation had not intervened. It is even possible that 
the authors of the Interim Agreement saw it as a device whereby certain 
preferential arrangements could be retained temporarily.
The Federal Tariff Structure
The Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland formally came into being 
in September, 1953, and the Federal Government assumed responsibility for 
customs administration on 1st April, 1954; all tariffs and restrictions on the 
inter-territorial movement of local products were eliminated except for certain 
quantitative restrictions operated in Nyasaland to conserve stocks of essential 
foods in that territory.
During 1954 a Tariff Commission recommended a Federal tariff struc­
ture and in 1955 negotiations took place between the Federal Government 
and Governments of the Union of South Africa, Australia, and the High 
Commission Territories in order to decide on future special trading relation­
ships. On 1st July, 1955, a Federal customs tariff and trade agreements with 
the countries mentioned came into force. Subsequently, agreements were 
negotiated with Canada, the Portuguese territories and Japan, and there was 
an informal agreement with Israel.
The Federation was not yet one entity from the point of view of external 
trade. Although uniform, and in a number of cases preferential, treatment 
of Federal exports in their external markets, irrespective of their Territorial 
origin, had been secured, imports were still subject to differential treatment 
in different areas of the Federation. This differentiation arose from the Congo 
Basin Treaties, which prohibited preferential tariff treatment of goods in an 
area of Africa which included the north-eastern part of Northern Rhodesia 
and the whole of Nyasaland. The Federal Government, with the support and 
assistance of the United Kingdom Government, was able, in the latter part 
of 1956, to persuade interested governments to agree to the application of 
the preferential provisions of Federal tariff and related agreements through­
out the Federation.
The Federal tariff was a discriminatory four column tariff, with the 
highest rates being charged under Column A and the lowest under Column 
D. Column D applied to imports from the United Kindom and the Colonies.
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Column C applied to other Commonwealth countries. Column B applied to 
a number of countries entitled to most favoured nation terms and Column A 
applied to all other countries, including Japan.
The structure of the rates of duty varied to a considerable extent. In the 
case of most materials and requisites for agriculture, mining, manufacturing 
and other industries the general rates applied in Columns A, B, C, and D, 
are 10 per cent, 5 per cent, Free and Free respectively. In the case of revenue 
items the general rates of duty were from 5-10 per cent in Column D, 10-15 
per cent in Column C, 20-25 per cent in Column B and up to 40 per cent in 
Column A. There were, however, rebates from these duties for materials and 
requisites for manufacturing industries.
The protective rates of duty varied according to the circumstances of 
the industry which was protected. They were rarely very high, however, 
varying generally from 10-20 per cent in Column D to 20-35 per cent in 
Column B. There were also certain specific rates of duty, e.g. in the piece 
goods tariff, which were applied for protective reasons. These mainly affected 
the cheaper lines of the categories concerned and operated as a barrier against 
low cost imports from other developing countries, including Commonwealth 
countries.
The general principle adopted in the granting of tariff preferences to 
particular countries was that the preferential columns of the tariff should 
normally be applied only to countries which ‘accord similar preferences or 
other benefits to the Federation’, and that, in the case of other countries, 
preference should be dependent on negotiation. The Tariff Commission 
agreed, nevertheless, that this principle should not be carried to the point of 
imposing duties of no negotiating value on capital goods, raw materials and 
other essential commodities of Commonwealth origin which, in the Federa­
tion’s own interests, should be admitted duty free.
Column D was applied to the United Kingdom on the grounds that she 
had always enjoyed preferences in the tariffs of the two Rhodesias, and that 
she provided the largest market for the Federation’s products and granted 
preferences to many of them. The other benefits to the Federation of her 
close association witfi the United Kingdom also weighed in favour of the 
granting of this concession.
Some members of the Commonwealth granted preferences to the Federa­
tion while others did not, but it was felt that the Federal tariff should not 
itself differentiate between Commonwealth countries. The Commission recom­
mended that consumer goods imported from the members of the Common­
wealth or Colonies should in general enter at the same rate as that applied 
under Column B to most favoured nations. Capital goods or raw materials of 
Commonwealth or Colonial origin upon which duties would not normally be
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imposed to serve as a weapon in reciprocal tariff negotiations, were allowed 
for at rates lower than those applying to most favoured nations and in 
accordance with the Commission’s general policy were usually free from 
Commonwealth, Colonial or United Kingdom sources. Column C erf the tariff 
was framed accordingly. The only major point of policy upon which the views 
of the Commission were not accepted was, in fact, the scope of Column C 
of the tariff. Column C rates were, in fact, generally applied to the British 
Colonies, only in respect of certain specified items.
Evolution of Federal Tariff Policy
After the creation of the Federal tariff there was a steady evolution in 
industrial tariff policy.13 From a policy envisaged mainly to assist ‘worthy’ 
existing manufacturers to meet external competition, it became a policy which, 
though still selective, was deliberately used to encourage industrial develop­
ment as a means towards development of the economy as a whole. The 
principle stages of this evolution are set out below.
The 1954 Tariff Commission opposed the general protection of manu­
facturing industry in the belief that this would increase prices and costs and 
that any benefits from protection would be outweighed by its disadvantages. 
It therefore recommended
(a) that protection should be granted on a selective basis to industries which, 
after investigation, were found to merit assistance.
(b) that in order to keep down the costs of primary and secondary production, 
tariff assistance should be confined so far as possible to consumer pro­
ducts.
(c) that where possible local industry should have access to raw materials 
on terms at least as favourable as those resulting from the normal forces 
of supply and demand.
In assessing the merits of particular industries for assistance the Com­
mission took into consideration such factors as ‘capital employed; the source 
of raw materials; the strategic value of the industry; the presence or absence 
of competing firms in the industry requiring assistance; the ability of the 
industry to offer employment, to supply the Federal market and to export 
its products . . .’ *
In 1956, following the report of a working party of officials on incentives 
and the structure in Industrial Development, more emphasis was laid on 
general considerations. Account was to be taken of whether the industry 
would use scarce or abundant local resources, including raw materials,
13 This account o f the developm ent of Federal tariff policies is derived largely from  the R eport o f  the Secretary to  the Federal M inistry o f Commerce and Industry fo r the 
year 1962.
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labour, power, water and transport. The attempt to confine protection to 
consumer goods was abandoned because cases could arise where the erection 
of an intermediate industry, based on local materials, would encourage the 
development of industries engaged in later stages of production. The absence 
of local competing firms did not necessarily inhibit protection, though in 
such cases ‘it might be necessary for Government to take other steps to pro­
tect the consumer’. The idea of ‘normal’ competition was clarified: ‘industries 
should be expected to compete with countries having high standards of living 
and transporting their products over long distances to the Federation’ and 
the raising of further tariffs against South Africa on the expiry of the 1955 
Trade Agreement was foreshadowed. Finally, the level of protection granted 
should not merely make the industry competitive with imports but, without 
actually barring importation completely, should be ‘effective so that produc­
tion can be planned on the lowest cost basis for the maximum number of 
units’.
In October 1958 tariff policy was restated in a directive to the Tariff 
Advisory Committee, which set out criteria for the selection of industry for 
protection and stated that ‘these criteria must be positively applied with the 
objective of encouraging the development of such industries as it is in the 
public interest to assist’. The criteria, which were published, were designed 
to relate the effects of protection to the economy as a whole. The concept of 
‘normal’ competition disappeared, but reference was made to the effect on 
the revenue of the Federal Government. Provision was made for the granting 
of protection in advance, in exceptional cases, from the preservation of 
margins of preference. It was clear that local intermediate products could 
be protected and that rebates would be withheld from new industries if 
necessary to afford such protection: rebates could also be granted for assembly 
purposes.
In 1962 following an official Committee of Inquiry into Manufacturing 
Industry in 1960 and an official Working Party Review of Economic Policies, 
carried out in consultation with Territorial Governments and organisations 
representative of mining, manufacturing, commerce and agriculture, a new 
statement of the objectives of industrial tariff policy was included in the 
Federal ‘Principles of Economic Policy’. The basis of selection became the 
net addition to the national income, so far as it could be ascertained.
In the middle of 1962 it became evident that the increase in manufactu­
ring activity which had been a feature of the Federal economy since 1953 
had ceased and the index of industrial production showed that the output of 
manufacturing industry in May, June and July, 1962, was some 2 or 3 per 
cent less than in the corresponding period for 1961. Urgent action was needed 
to stimulate activity in manufacturing industry, particularly as the level of
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employment in the economy as a whole was tending to fall and there was 
known to be a large number of persons seeking work.
It was decided that the most effective stimulant to manufacturing industry 
which would help also to stimulate economic activity in other sectors would 
be an increase in customs duties on a wide range of items competitive with 
those produced in the Federation, in order to divert consumer spending from 
imported to locally manufactured goods. In August 1962, a large range of 
new protective tariffs were applied with the deliberate intention of stimulating 
sales by local industries with excess capacity.
It was anticipated that the increase in customs duties would result in an 
increase in the gross output of manufacturing industry of approximately 
£5 million within twelve months, accompanied by an increase in employment. 
The ripple effect of the rise in output was expected to benefit the entire 
economy. So that industry would not take advantage of the increased tariffs 
to raise the prices of items locally produced a clear warning was given by the 
Minister of Commerce and Industry that any abuse would lead to a sus­
pension of duty on the particular item back to the previous level.
The new tariff levels undoubtedly had a beneficial effect on the consumer 
goods industries in so far as imports of consumer goods fell from £44.3 million 
in the twelve months to August, 1962 to £39.5 million in the following twelve 
months.14 There was also a recovery in manufacturing output and by March, 
1963, the relevant index figure was higher than for the corresponding period 
of previous years. Taking 1959 as 100, the figures for 1962 and 1963 respec­
tively were 107.1 and 108.1.15 16The recovery in output was not matched by a 
recovery in manufacturing employment and the monthly average of Africans 
employed in Southern Rhodesia fell from 73,400 in 1962 to 65,100 in 1963.1,5
The South African Trade Agreement
The formation of the Federation necessitated the review of the trading 
arrangements of the Federal territories with South Africa. Under the arrange­
ments operating before Federation local products, except excisable commodi­
ties, moved between Northern Rhodesia and South Africa free of duty, the 
importing country being compensated for loss of revenue by an annual fiscal 
transfer from the exporting country. As indicated above, Southern Rhodesia’s 
arrangement with South Africa differed fundamentally from that of Northern 
Rhodesia in that, although a wide range of Southern Rhodesian goods enjoyed 
duty free entry into South Africa, many Southern Rhodesian manufacturers
14 Calculated from  T able 24, M onthly Digest of Statistics, Central Statistical Office, 
Salisbury, January, 1964.
15 M onthly Digest, January, 1964, Table 22.
16 M onthly Digest, August, 1964, Table 7.
42 RHODESIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
were protected by tariffs and the government of Southern Rhodesia made no 
fiscal transfer to South Africa.
Under the agreement negotiated by the Federal Government with South 
Africa in 1955,17 South African goods were merely to be accorded with 
varying preferences, which G.A.T.T. accepted as being less extensive than 
those hitherto prevailing. The right to free entry for South African goods to 
Northern Rhodesia was eliminated and the Federal tariffs were to apply 
throughout the Federation. Free entry to South Africa was preserved for 
certain Federal products, including for the first time Nyasaland agricultural 
produce. The provision in the 1948 agreement for duty free entry into South 
Africa of 2 million lb. of leaf tobacco was also retained.
In 1959 the Federal Government announced its intention to terminate 
the 1955 Agreement and its determination to insist on greater trading auto­
nomy in any new Agreement. Such an Agreement was negotiated and came 
into force on 1st July, 1960. It was to remain in force for five years.
The terms of the Agreement substituted for the special preferences 
formerly enjoyed by South Africa the preferential tariff applicable to self- 
governing Commonwealth countries. Federal products, with the exception 
of a specified list, were to enjoy the most-favoured-nation rate in the Republic’s 
tariff. The exceptions, which included certain footwear, clothing and textile 
items, radios, radiograms, television sets, sound-recording apparatus and 
cigarettes, were to enjoy various concessionary rates which, in some cases, 
resulted in duty-free entry into the Republic.
In the agricultural sector the Republic agreed to continue to permit the 
entry, free of duty, of an annual quota of 2 million lb. of Federal flue-cured 
Virginia-type tobacco. The Agreement further provided that neither party 
should apply import controls to the produce of the other except in the case 
of a list of items, mainly agricultural, appearing in an annexure to the 
Agreement.
The 1960 Agreement provided for a much narrower range of tariff con­
cessions on both sides than the 1955 Agreement which had accorded to most 
South African goods the lowest rates in the Federal tariff. Thus, in this 
respect, the 1960 Agreement was more in consonance with the industrial 
development aspirations of the Federal Government, since South African 
industries were the Federation’s most direct competitor over almost the whole 
range of manufacturing. In terms of the 1960 Agreement the departure of 
South Africa from the Commonwealth in 1961 involved no change in the 
tariff treatment of South African goods imported into the Federation.
17 F o r a  South A frican view o f this Agreem ent see G . F . D . Palm er, ‘A  N ote on the 
T rade Agreem ent Between the U nion and the Federation o f Rhodesia and N yasa­land’, South African Journal of Economics, Volum e 23, N o. 3, 1955.
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The new Agreement proved to be double-edged for although many 
Rhodesian manufactures now enjoyed greater protection in the Federal 
market one of the effects of the Agreement was to place certain industries, 
including textiles, clothing and footwear, which had built up substantial 
export markets in the Republic with the assistance of the preferential tariff 
provided in the 1955 Agreement, in considerable if temporary difficulty.
The formation of the Federation also necessitated the revision of the 
trading arrangements between the Federal territories and the then High 
Commission territories. A Customs Agreement between the three territories 
and the Federation came into effect in 1956. It provided that trade between 
the Federation and Basutoland and Swaziland should be subject to the same 
conditions as trade between the Federation and South Africa. In respect of 
Bechuanaland however, the Agreement created virtually a free trade area 
and allowed the movement of goods produced in either country, with a few 
exception, notably potable spirits, free of duty or restriction into the territory 
of the other.
The Agreement also recognised the substantial entrepot trade between 
the Federation and the Protectorate and, in the case of re-exports, provided 
for payment by the government of the exporting country to the government 
of the receiving country the duties collected on first importation. Special 
provisions were made for motor-spirit, motor vehicles and goods subject to 
excise duties. The Agreement was of indefinite duration, but terminable on 
six month’s notice by either side.
The Japanese Trading Arrangement
In view of subsequent developments, one other bilateral arrangement— 
that with Japan—may be regarded as being of particular significance.
Until 1959, trade between the Federation and Japan was comparatively 
small in both directions.18 No formal trading relationship between the two 
countries existed and, as the Federation had invoked Article XXXV of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade at the time of Japan’s accession to 
the G.A.T.T. in 1955, there was no obligation on the part of either country 
to accord most-favoured-nation treatment to the goods of the otheri either in 
respect of customs dutjes or import controls.
However, the growth of Federal domestic manufacturing industry, 
particularly the clothing industry, created a demand in the Federation for 
Japanese textiles and other materials for further manufacture, while Japan’s 
own industrial expansion provided a large potential market for a number of 
the Federation’s important export products.
18 This account o f the developm ent o f trading relations with Japan  is derived from  the Reports o f the Secretary to  the Federal M inistry o f Commerce and Industry fo r 1962 and 1963.
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Against the background of these developments, and as a result of a 
visit to Japan by officials, a trading arrangement with Japan with a life of 
one year was entered into early in 1960. It set out as the ultimate objective 
of policy the achievement of full most-favoured-nation treatment but pro­
vided that, whilst the movement towards this objective should be progressive, 
it should be made without undue haste. It provided, in broad terms, for the 
reciprocal removal of tariff discrimination, with the Federation’s applying 
its most-favoured-nation tariff to Japanese goods and Japan’s undertaking 
to apply its own most-favoured-nation tariff to Federal goods. As regards 
import control the Federation would grant import facilities for a limited 
range of Japanese products, mainly capital goods or other goods for industrial 
use and, in return, Japan would accord import licensing facilities for eighteen 
important Federal exports, most of which were primary agricultural or mineral 
products.
In April 1961 a new arrangement, of indefinite duration, was negotiated. 
Like the earlier one, it declared full most-favoured-nation treatment to be 
the ultimate objective of both Governments, but recognised that this would 
not be practicable in the short term. It included lists of products for which 
import facilities were to be granted and it provided for an annual review 
of the administrative measures taken to implement the arrangement. Simul­
taneously, administrative measures taken by the Federation freed a further 
substantial range of Japanese goods from discriminatory restrictions but left 
the majority of items still subject to import controls. On the other hand, 
virtually all, actual or potential, Federal exports to Japan enjoyed non- 
discriminatory import licensing, even where balance of payments restrictions 
vyere in force in that country.
Subsequently, the Japanese Government indicated through G.A.T.T. that 
it intended to remove, by October 1962, the greater part of its balance-of- 
payments import controls, including those affecting, among other major 
Federal exports, copper and tobacco. Japan made it clear that it would not 
undertake to extend its own liberalization automatically to those countries 
which continued to apply a substantial discrimination against Japanese exports 
and that retaliatory discrimination was a possibility.
In these circumstances, when officials of the Ministry met representatives 
of the Japanese Government in Salisbury, during October and November 
1961, to  review the administrative measures to be applied during 1962, a 
fresh approach was adopted and the Federation decided to remove discrimi­
nation against Japan in all fields where imports from Japan were unlikely 
to damage the Federation’s domestic industries. This change in the structure 
of the import licensing offered Japan the opportunity of developing its trade
in the fields outside the textile market where it had formerly been concen­
trated and where Federal industry was most sensitive.
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The Federation announced at the 20th session of G.A.T.T. that it had 
agreed in principle to the disinvocation of Article XXXV of the General 
Agreement against Japan—and, therefore, the ending of discriminatory im­
port controls—provided that satisfactory safeguards for Rhodesian industry 
could be negotiated. Subsequent discussions resulted in a new agreement 
between the Federation and Japan which came into effect in August, 1963, 
and Article XXXV was disinvoked at the same time.
Under the new agreement the respective governments agreed to accord 
the products of the other country most-favoured-nation treatment. Only a 
very limited list of Japanese goods remained subject to import control on 
entry into the Federation.
The development of formal trading relationships with Japan was 
accompanied by a rapid expansion of trade.19 Imports grew from £591,000 
in 1956 to £4,865,000 in 1963. From the Rhodesian point of view export 
trends were even more favourable. Exports increased from £326,000 in 1956 
to over £13 million in 1963 in which year Japan was the Federation’s fourth 
largest market, coming after the United Kingdom, West Germany and South 
Africa. The main imports were cotton and rayon fabrics which in 1963 
together accounted £2.9 million while the main export was copper which 
was valued at £7.7 million in the same year. Pig iron and unmanufactured 
tobacco were the other principal exports.
Perhaps, however, it is by the trading links forged, rather than by the 
volume of imports and exports in these years, that the arrangements negotiated 
in the Federal period should be judged.
Conclusion
It is difficult to assess, even in the broadest terms, the contribution of 
Federal tariff policy to the development of the Rhodesian economy. The 
official index of industrial production (1959=100) shows an increase from 
70.7 in 1955 to 115.2 in 1963.20 The net output of manufacturing industry in 
Southern Rhodesia alone has been calculated to have increased from £35.4 
million in 1956 to £62.5 million in 1963,21 though these figures are accompa­
nied by a warning that they are not strictly comparable.
In more general terms it may be shown that nearly two-thirds of the 
non-durable consumer goods consumed in the Federation in 1962 were of 
local manufacture and that local factories were able to supply nearly one-
19 Federation o f R hodesia and Nyasaland, A nnual Statem ent o f External T rade, 1963.
20 M onthly Digest o f Statistics, M arch, 1964, T able 32.
21 M onthly Digest, August, 1964, Table 34.
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third of the materials, plant and equipment required by local manufacturers. 
Production of this order meant a considerable relief for the Federal balance 
of payments which also benefited in 1962 from exports valued at £16.3 
million.22
It would, of course, be a serious mistake to seek to attribute the growth 
of manufacturing industry solely to the protective policies followed by the 
Federal Government. For example, it is probable that the rapid growth in 
the early years of Federation owed something to the boom conditions in 
the Northern Rhodesian copper industry as well as to the general euphoria 
which accompanied the formation of the Federation that was also reflected 
in the building boom.
Nevertheless the claim of the Federal Government in its Economic 
Report for 1958 that ‘the much wider market afforded by Federation, 
coupled with the new Federal tariff, and related trade agreements . . . (had) 
encouraged the establishment of new industries at a much accelerated tempo' 
was probably legitimate.
The tariff changes that came with Federation widened the market in 
two ways. First, the increase in import duties over those previously pre­
vailing widened the market by making Southern Rhodesian manufactures 
more competitive in all three territories than they were before. It should be 
noted that the removal of inter-territorial duties, without an increase in the 
external tariff, would not have achieved this effect, for there were no duties 
on Southern Rhodesian manufactures in Northern Rhodesia before Federa­
tion anA the Southern Rhodesian market would likewise have been unaffected. 
Second, the market was widened to the extent that purchases in Nyasaland 
and the north-eastern part of Northern Rhodesia were switched from imports 
to Southern Rhodesian manufactures. While the Congo Basin Treaties 
covered Nyasaland it had often been cheaper for that country to obtain its 
imports from overseas, but the formation of the customs union with the 
other Federal territories opened the Nyasaland market to Rhodesian industry. 
The benefit of this development for Rhodesian industry should not be 
exaggerated since the total imports of Nyasaland in 1963 were only £7.6 
million, but the burden of higher cost Rhodesian products on the Nyasaland 
consumer may have been considerable.23
There is one final point which must be considered—the effect upon
22 R eport to  the Secretary to  the Federal M inistry o f Commerce and Industry, 1963.
23 F o r  discussions o f the  effect o f  Federal tariff arrangem ents on  Nyasaland, see A rthur 
H azlew ood and  P. D . Henderson, Nyasaland: The Economics of Federation (Basil Blackwell) 1960, and A rth u r Hazlewood (Editor), African Integration and Dis­
integration, (O.U.P.) 1967.
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labour.24 The growth of manufacturing output was not accompanied by 
anything approaching a proportionate increase in the industrial labour force. 
The number of Europeans, Asians and Coloureds employed in manufacturing 
in Southern Rhodesia increased from 10,990 in 1954 to a peak of 15,810 in 
1962, but the percentage increase in African employment was much smaller, 
from 62,500 to 73,400.25 Thus, whatever the other benefits of tariff .protection, 
the provision of additional employment opportunities can hardly rank high. 
It must be said, however, that average earnings in manufacturing increased 
rapidly, particularly for the African employees. Whilst the average wage for 
Europeans, Asians and Coloureds increased from £973 in 1954 to £1,297 in 
1962, that for Africans increased from £65 to £164 in the same period.
It is also interesting to note that earnings continued to rise even after 
the decline in the numbers employed which occurred in 1963 and 1964. 
Average African earnings in manufacturing industry were almost identical 
to the average for the money economy as a whole in 1954—£65 for manu- 
facutring as against £64 for the whole economy—but by 1962 they had far 
outstripped the national average and this relatively faster growth continued 
into 1963 and 1964 so that in the latter year, average African earnings in 
manufacturing were £198 as against £121 overall.26
Thus it is clear that a small fraction of the African population has 
benefited considerably from the growth of manufacturing in Rhodesia and 
probably from the tariff policies of the Federal Government and its prede­
cessors, though against this it must be remembered that the purchasing power 
of the mass of Africans in all three Federal territories was almost certainly 
adversely affected by the increased prices of imported goods or the need to 
purchase higher price Rhodesian products, sometimes of inferior quality.
The validity of this last point may be a matter for argument. The point 
which is abundantly clear is that the expansion of manufacturing industry, 
even when assisted by an intelligently applied tariff and trade policy, cannot 
possibly solve Rhodesia’s gravest economic problem, that of its labour surplus.
#
Salisbury.
24 O n this po in t see the  interesting article b y  D . S. Pearson, ‘Em ploym ent Trends in  a  
Developing Econom y: T he Case o f Southern Rhodesia’, East African Economic 
Review, June, 1964.
25 M onthly Digest o f Statistics, August, 1964, T able 7.
26 M onthly Digest, January  1966, T able 10.
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